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Mike Reid 
Since its election in 2008 the current government has initiated 
a number of  policy debates that directly broach the question 
of  who should be making decisions about the nature and 
role of  local government. While the question of  Auckland 
governance (see Reid, 2009) has been in the headlines, the 
debate has recently been extended by the addition of  two 
further issues: who should determine what councils do and 
how should this occur? It is an issue which burst into life 
with the release of  a Cabinet paper entitled ‘Improving 
Local Government Transparency, Accountability and Fiscal 
Management’ (TAFM) (Cabinet Office, 2009). In that Cabinet 
paper, which signalled a review of  the Local Government 
Act 2002, the minister of  local government, Rodney Hide, 
stated that councils should focus on core services, which in 
his view meant:
while there is no definition of  core services for local 
government, I would expect there to be general acceptance 
that it includes transport services (roading, footpaths and 
public transport); water services (water supply, sewage 
treatment, stormwater and flood protection) and public 
health and safety services (refuse collection and regulation 
of  nuisances). (Cabinet Office, 2009, p.4) 
Not surprisingly, the paper generated a flurry of  activity 
as almost every group, from librarians to museum providers, 
sought to get their particular services on the supposed list.1 
However, it was far from clear whether the paper reflected 
government policy or ministerial wishful thinking. Following 
public release of  the TAFM paper the opposition sought to 
expose discrepancies between the minister’s minimalist view 
and a range of  statements and initiatives endorsed by the 
prime minister suggesting much broader roles.2 Since then 
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the issue has continued to attract attention, driven particularly 
by the minister of  local government’s regular speeches on the 
issue. The following extract is typical:
Ratepayers and citizens need much more say in what’s 
done with their money, because they have to pay the price 
for the often silly and outlandish expenditure decisions of  
councils. If  money is spent poorly and a project flops, it’s 
the poor old ratepayer who foots the bill.
There are plenty of  examples of  inappropriate 
council spending ñ Hamilton City Council’s investment in 
the local Novotel Hotel and the South Taranaki District 
Council buying the Hawera movie theatre. One of  the 
Southland local authorities even took ownership of  a 
local Lotto shop! That’s an outrageous use of  ratepayers’ 
hard-earned money.
We are going to shift the balance of  power back 
to ratepayers and citizens so they have the control they 
deserve. (Hide, 2009a) 
While the minister’s proposals are expected to have their 
first reading in Parliament before the end of  the year, the 
issues he raises deserve somewhat greater scrutiny than they 
have so far received. This article attempts to answer at least 
four critical questions raised by the debate: What is the core 
service debate all about? How relevant are the minister’s 
examples of  non-core services? Is there a problem? And what 
are the likely implications for councils and their communities 
should the minister’s plans go ahead?
What are core services?
According to the minister of  local government and his 
officials, local government should have a core set of  services 
determined by Parliament and these services are those 
associated with physical infrastructure and the protection of  
health, rather than services concerned with enhancing well-
being. Councils that wish to offer services beyond the core 
would be required to get their citizens’ permission, probably 
through some form of  binding referenda. It is an idea that 
is worthy of  somewhat greater scrutiny than it has so far 
received.
The notion that services provided by local governments 
can be divided neatly into categories of  core and non-core 
is something about which there is little if  any supporting 
theory. Most accepted theories which address the role of  
government, whether local or national, tend to be less 
definitive, accepting that such decisions are best not set in 
concrete as appropriateness is likely to be 
affected by changing technology, politics 
and values. A prescriptive act leads to 
volumes of  amendments as situations 
arise that weren’t envisaged. History 
suggests a fairly dynamic understanding 
of  what services we think our public 
sectors should undertake. For example, 
today we no longer expect councils to 
run abattoirs, even though a few years 
ago it was considered routine. Today citizens’ have higher 
expectations of  their local and central governments than they 
did a century ago, particularly with the growth of  the welfare 
state since the Second World War. So the idea that we should 
fix roles and functions in legislation is at least curious.
Economic theory treats governments as having four 
primary roles: allocative, distributive, regulatory and 
stabilisation (Bailey, 1999). Distribution, regulation and 
stabilisation are roles that national governments are best 
positioned to undertake, whereas allocative functions are best 
undertaken by local governments (ibid.). The economic case 
for local government hinges on the value of  decentralising 
or devolving services to lower levels of  government in order 
to meet the diverse preferences of  consumers, yet services 
probably should not be considered in isolation from form 
and finance. Thinking about the interrelationship between 
functions, form and funding, Bailey suggests that:
• local government should provide the majority of  public 
sector services because their benefits are localised;
• local government should only provide services where the 
risk of  local market failure is high and of  government 
failure is low;
• the jurisdictions of  local governments should as far as 
practicable be coterminous with the areas benefiting from 
the provision of  their services;
• councils should be as small as possible, while still achieving 
economies of  scale;
• matching of  financing and benefit may require regional 
government for the provision of  some services;
• scope for exit should be facilitated by increasing the 
scope for inter-municipal competition for residents and 
decentralisation of  services within council areas.
Thinking about functions in relation to form and funding 
suggests a contingency and dynamism that is not captured in 
the current debate on core services, which has not really got 
beyond the suggestion of  a list determined by Parliament. 
Bailey’s work suggests that ideas about core services will vary 
according to the size of  councils, how they are funded and the 
form of  the local government system. For example, any idea 
of  core is likely to be affected by the existence or otherwise of  
strong regional government. What might be core in the new 
Auckland is unlikely to be core in Waimate.
Citizens themselves, however, do have a sense that some 
local services are more important than others and when 
asked what these council services might be the majority of  
citizens tend to highlight the most recognisable. A nationwide 
In popular conception, core is probably regarded 
as essential: that is, whatever other things 
councils do, we must have roads, water and 
sewage systems and the rubbish needs to be 
collected. 
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telephone survey commissioned by Local Government New 
Zealand in 2006 asked respondents what the top priorities for 
councils should be. The answers were roads and road safety 
(38% of  respondents); water and sanitation (32%); town 
planning and environmental management (22%) and rubbish 
collection and disposal (19%). Other services were regarded 
as enhancements. Interestingly, when asked to identify what 
services are undertaken by councils most respondents could 
identify only three: rubbish collection and disposal; road 
and road safety services; and water and sanitation services. 
Core seems to be those things we use regularly and know for 
certain are provided by the council. In popular conception, 
core is probably regarded as essential: that is, whatever other 
things councils do, we must have roads, water and sewage 
systems and the rubbish needs to be collected. 
One of  the problems with attempting to define councils’ 
services as being either core or discretionary, with the core 
defined by Parliament, is whether or not all councils provide 
them. For example, one of  the minister’s core services, 
according to TAFM, is rubbish collection. It would be a very 
expensive exercise if  councils were to be required to ensure 
that all properties had access to a public rubbish collection 
service, as this is a service few rural communities currently 
have access to; it is a similar story with potable water and 
sewage. How can something be a core service if  some councils 
don’t actually provide it for many of  their citizens? One way 
around this difficulty would be to create three categories of  
services, for example:
• mandated core services: determined by Parliament and 
required of  all councils;
• mandated discretionary services: a list of  discretionary 
services determined by Parliament that councils can 
adopt if  they wish; and
• fully discretionary services: any lawful service that the 
community gives the council permission to undertake 
through a poll or referendum or similar means. 
Something like the above appears to be the most logical 
move should the government wish to be more prescriptive 
about the activities councils undertake. However, are there 
other ways of  conceptualising the notion of  core services? 
As a noun, ‘core’ refers to the centre of  things. For example, 
the core of  the earth is the centre of  the earth. If  we take this 
definition and apply it to services and organisations we are 
probably referring to those services which are in some way 
at the centre of  our organisations: that is, what they exist to 
do. What organisations exist for is to fulfil their purpose, so 
surely their purpose should be at the centre of  their role. The 
Local Government Act 2002 describes the purpose of  local 
government in relatively abstract terms, namely:
a) to enable democratic local decision making and action by, 
and on behalf  of, communities;
b) to promote the social, economic, environmental and 
cultural well-being of  communities in the present and for 
the future.
In other words, local government exists to provide a 
way for communities to make decisions about their current 
and future well-being, bearing in mind that the rest of  the 
legislation then puts limits around the extent of  that decision-
making power. Other jurisdictions take a similar approach 
to defining the purpose of  their local government systems, 
with statements such as promoting ‘the good 
governance of  the community’ or ‘promoting 
well-being’ common. The purpose statement 
in the Local Government Act 1974 was less 
succinct but similarly emphasised collective 
decision making. So, at the highest level of  
abstraction, the core of  local government 
involves the process of  collective decision 
making.
When approaching the matter of  what 
local government should do there are two 
fundamental questions: who should decide, and is there 
actually a problem? Under the current legislation there are 
two mechanisms which determine what councils do: one 
is the passage of  binding legislation by Parliament and the 
other is a decision supported by a majority of  councillors in a 
formal meeting. Interestingly, the number of  responsibilities 
Parliament has placed on local governments is relatively 
modest, particularly when compared to other countries, 
with the majority being regulatory functions carried out on 
behalf  of  the Crown. These are described in the Appendix 
to this article. The minister’s announcements so far could 
be interpreted as suggesting that core services are those 
defined by Parliament and anything else will be discretionary. 
However, the minister goes slightly further, suggesting that 
decisions about undertaking any of  these discretionary 
services should not be made by elected councillors. They 
should instead be made by the community itself, through a 
referenda process. 
The problem of definition
The reification of  core services in legislation fails to recognise 
the degree to which the range of  services provided by councils 
tends to be dynamic over time. Today, no self-respecting city 
of  any size could go without a medium-sized indoor sports 
stadium, reflecting growing community wealth and changing 
expectations. In the past it was normal for councils to operate 
abattoirs, ports, airports and, until the early 1970s, the fire 
brigade. Increasingly, councils are putting activities like art 
galleries, museums and zoos into trusts and companies in 
order to establish them as arm’s-length entities and attract 
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So ‘core’ is a fluid concept, which is likely to 
be contingent on technology as well as on 
political and community preferences.    
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investment from other parties. So ‘core’ is a fluid concept, 
which is likely to be contingent on technology as well as on 
political and community preferences. It is not a concept 
that fits well with the idea of  nationally-dictated lists of  
permissible local activities.
A century ago, councils operated gas works and electricity 
departments, and Wellington City, for example, employed 
the conductor of  the local sinfonia orchestra. As societies 
change, so does the range of  activities we expect our local 
civic organisations to provide. In the sixties and seventies, 
as urbanisation increased, councils became operators of  car 
parking buildings, and many still are. However, as improved 
technologies and higher demands have encouraged the 
private sector to become more active, other councils have 
moved out of  this activity and left it to the market. In fact, 
the history of  local government is one in which councils have 
shown a capacity to adapt to meet the needs of  changing 
societies. Their proximity to communities means councils are 
better placed than Parliament to respond.
The proposal to define core services takes us back to 
the Local Government Act 1974, which had approximately 
300ñ400 pages concerned with describing the activities 
councils were permitted to do. Yet despite this level of  
detailed guidance, councils frequently resorted to legal 
advice to ensure their intended decisions were within the law. 
Risk aversion was rife. The problem concerns our ability to 
define clearly the nature of  a service. For example, while it 
may seem straightforward to put in legislation that running 
parks is a permitted activity, the definition of  ‘park’ is likely 
to be contested ground. Will a sports field or a forest park 
be consistent with the definition of  ‘park’ employed in the 
legislation? And will the right to provide parks extend to 
botanical gardens and scented gardens for 
the blind? How would the town belt of  
Wellington be defined? Is all of  it a park, 
or only those areas specifically labelled 
as parks, like Hataitai and Newtown? 
Attempting to resolve these issues through 
legislation highlights the problems of  blunt 
instruments. 
Likewise, while the legislation might 
permit councils to operate museums and 
libraries, will it be legal to run a combined 
museum and library? Will the combined 
facility be defined as some new form of  
facility which does not appear on the list? While the definition 
of  museum might be relatively clear in the popular mind, 
would Te Papa, with its interactive attractions, comply? If  a 
museum includes live tuatara in its exhibitions, will it still be 
a museum, or will it have become a zoo and possibly outside 
the core? Do not laugh: this is what life was like under the 
Local Government Act 1974. The result was a range of  quite 
perverse behaviours as councils sought to find ways around 
the limitations of  statutory language in order to meet the 
needs and expectations of  their citizens. Parliament simply 
lacks the information to make these kinds of  judgements 
and our society is, thankfully, not uniform enough to 
compartmentalise.
Defined lists make councils risk averse as their focus 
tends to shift from a concern with community well-being 
to the issue of  whether decisions are legal or not. As well, 
measures which create recourse to lawyers in order to 
define the nature of  each service increase the opportunity 
for gaming, as they allow external parties to utilise the core 
debate to drive the policy agenda, effectively undermining 
representative democracy. Given the contingent nature of  
most council services (even roads ñ it was only ten years ago 
that proposals were being discussed for taking them away 
councils), enabling locally-elected members in consultation 
with their citizens to determine the mix of  services that best 
matches local preferences and willingness to pay is surely the 
most efficient choice.
New Zealand is a country of  communities and they vary 
considerably. The local government framework currently 
gives councils substantial discretion which enables them to 
develop the appropriate mix of  services to reflect the different 
communities they govern. For example, while the cost of  
roading dominates the budgets of  most rural councils, in a 
few cases reaching 60ñ70% of  their expenditure, in urban 
councils it is generally less than 20%. The challenging issues 
for most cities concern the soft infrastructures, like youth 
services, community safety and economic development. Is 
it reasonable to try and define a core set of  services for a 
sector which is so diverse? Will we see a resurgence of  local 
bills, as existed before the Local Government Act 2002, to 
validate local decisions taken to deal with local issues which 
were outside the core? 
Will a list of parliamentary-defined core services enhance 
local democracy?
In practice, any list of  services given the status of  ‘core’ by 
Parliament is likely to enhance the status of  those services in 
comparison to others, even if  the others are more relevant 
to a particular community. Clearly that will be Parliament’s 
intention, but is it desirable in the context of  our goal of  
strengthening local democracy? One issue, which is noted 
above, is the risk that those councils not currently providing 
the defined services will come under community pressure to 
provide them, with corresponding pressure on funding for 
... the whole reform of Auckland is an 
indication that we need to adjust our 
governance arrangements to reflect local  
and regional diversity.
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smaller rural councils. In addition, a nationally-defined list 
will be seen as the default functions of  local government 
and might be seen as representing a ‘creeping centralism’ 
which will, over time, result in greater homogeneity and 
standardisation and less diversity between councils. We are in 
a period in our history when the idea that Wellington knows 
best would attract almost universal scorn. Indeed, the whole 
reform of  Auckland is an indication that we need to adjust 
our governance arrangements to reflect local and regional 
diversity. This suggests an appetite for greater diversity, not 
less. 
Nationally-elected politicians are poorly placed to second 
guess the decisions of  locally-elected politicians when 
determining, in consultation with citizens, the appropriate 
mix of  local goods and services to match citizens’ preferences 
and willingness to pay. These are seldom simple decisions 
as they involve trade-offs (the ‘I want to do X but not if  it 
means losing Y’ debate) and are best made in a deliberative 
setting. There are also advantages in these decisions being 
made in multiple local settings rather than in one place, such 
as Parliament, as it diminishes the risk of  policy capture by 
single-interest groups. 
The New Zealand Parliament has the undisputed 
authority to make decisions about what councils do, if  it 
chooses to exercise that authority. In the past, Parliaments 
have tended to approach this issue with some caution, as local 
government is part of  a nation’s constitutional framework and 
decisions that undermine local self-government effectively 
undermine its democratic framework. The critical aspect of  
a democracy is that governments are able to respond to the 
needs, expectations and demands of  their citizens. 
Even if  Parliament approached the issue with due 
caution, there is still the question of  whether or not a national 
body is in the best place and has access to the necessary 
information to determine the right mix of  activities local 
authorities should undertake. Until 2002 local government 
legislation was generally based on the principle of  ultra vires, 
which essentially limited councils to only those activities the 
legislation allowed. Not surprisingly, the legislation was often 
out of  touch with the demands being made on councils, 
necessitating frequent trips to Parliament for amendments; 
for example:
• to allow the Wellington Regional Council to contribute to 
the costs of  constructing the ‘cake tin’ in Wellington;
• the transfer of  local facilities and tourism promotion from 
the three territorial authorities in Taranaki to the Taranaki 
Regional Council at the request of  the territorials; and
• to enable the Hawke’s Bay Regional Council to distribute 
port profits through a one-off  payment of  cash to local 
ratepayers. 
In short, legislation is a blunt and inflexible instrument. 
Parliament is too far removed from the local coal face to 
know in advance what communities require and national 
politicians lack the appropriate incentives or flexibility to 
respond quickly to local needs.
The impact of defining core services on the role of councillors
New Zealand has a system of  representative local democracy; 
that is, elections are held regularly in order to elect 
representatives to make decisions on behalf  of  their citizens, 
in a similar manner to the way in which central 
government works. Actions that interfere with the 
relationship between voters and elected members 
can be problematic, as they have the potential to 
reduce the elected members’ decision-making 
sphere and undermine their accountability. 
The more the decision-making authority of  
elected members is constrained by higher-level 
governments, the less interest citizens are likely to 
take in local government. For example, a survey 
undertaken by the Local Government Chronicle 
in the United Kingdom identified the limited 
decision-making authority of  councillors in that country as 
a major reason for poor voter turnout at local government 
elections. In the United Kingdom, constraints on councillor 
decision-making are caused by the highly centralised nature 
of  their system and extensive use of  nationally-determined 
performance targets. 
Reducing the scope of  councillor discretion is also likely 
to diminish the willingness of  people to stand for elected 
office, as the opportunities to ‘make a difference’ will be 
considerably less than under a generally empowered regime. 
Certainly, early feedback Local Government New Zealand 
has received from some of  its members suggests that many 
of  them will reappraise their political futures if  the role of  
an elected member is diminished further. The same applies 
to staff. Recent research undertaken by the Society of  Local 
Government Managers suggested that officials would also 
find a more prescriptive and limiting approach to their 
council’s role less satisfying from a job/career perspective. 
Key aspects of  their work which they valued involved: 
• a place where you can make a difference to peoples’ 
lives;
service to the community; 
• making the best of  poorly-crafted government legisla-
tion; 
• making a difference for the future; and
• working for the development of  the city.
Requiring Parliament to define core services essentially 
removes the decision from local communities, who pay the 
Thought ... needs to be given to developing a 
framework that allows for management of low-
skill migration and, in these [domestic] jobs, 
a primarily female migration. This framework 
needs to keep multiple goals in mind.  
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bill, and thus limits their ability to make trade-offs with 
regard to the use of  their own resources. It may also require 
councils to undertake complex processes to go beyond the 
parliamentary list which are unlikely to be efficient. These 
decisions are best made locally; the question is, should they 
be made by local politicians elected by and accountable to 
local citizens, or by citizens themselves?
Measures to shift decision making from elected members 
to citizens themselves through referenda are likely to be quite 
problematic, as many of  these so called non-core activities 
need only very minor resources to achieve their aims and are 
likely to cost less than the cost of  a referendum. In addition, 
the evidence suggests that participation in referenda will be 
quite low, and likely to decrease over time if  councils need to 
resort to them frequently. The result is that a small number of  
voters will be able to control council expenditure and activity. 
It is difficult to see this as somehow preferable to the current 
situation, where elected councillors make such decisions in 
open forum based on a consultative process. Presumably, 
those community facilities outside the core which are not 
supported by a referendum will need to be disposed of. Will 
important parts of  our cultural heritage thus be up for sale 
because they are non-core?
Is there really a problem?
One of  the astonishing aspects of  this discussion is the lack of  any 
proper evidence that New Zealand has a problem here. The core 
service debate appears to be driven by a perception that councils 
have extended their activities beyond what the majority of  their 
citizens are prepared to pay for or what they have traditionally 
done. There is simply no evidence to back this view, particularly 
given the fact that New Zealand local government is one of  the 
smallest local government sectors in the OECD and isn’t growing 
significantly, as shown in Figure 1.
In the last five years, three separate inquiries have 
considered this question and each has come to the same 
conclusion: namely, that there is no evidence of  any systemic 
increase in new activities undertaken by local authorities. 
The first study was undertaken by a joint officials group, the 
Local Government Funding Project. In its final report the 
officials state: 
no evidence to date has been produced to suggest that 
local government as a whole is undertaking a wider group 
of  functions than it had prior to 2003. In cases where 
councils have taken on additional responsibilities these 
have proved to be quite small in scale and operational in 
nature. (Local Government Funding Project Team, 2006, 
p.18) 
This view was reinforced a year later by both the report 
of  the Inquiry into Local Government Rates and the Local 
Government Commission’s review of  the Local Government 
Act 2002. The report of  the Rates Inquiry stated:
The panel received many submissions suggesting the LGA 
2002 has been a major driver of  increased expenditures 
in that it encouraged councils to move into activities 
outside their ‘core business’ by giving them a power of  
general competence. The Panel could find little evidence 
to support this. (Rates Inquiry, 2007, p.5)
To the degree that there has been change it is most 
pronounced in a few regional councils that have contributed 
primarily to regional economic development activities, such 
as investment in regional facilities. Rather than problems, 
these decisions should probably be seen as economically 
prudent, as the regions are better placed to spread the 
costs of  these services over the full range of  beneficiaries, 
one of  the reasons for the reorganisation of  Auckland. Yet 
despite systemic evidence to the contrary, the minister of  
local government continues to argue that local politicians are 
taking liberties and spending ratepayers’ money on activities 
for which they have no credible licence, activities that are not 
core and for which they have not sought ratepayer or citizen 
permission. 
So what do non-core activities actually look like? The 
minister has highlighted three examples, as noted earlier: 
the Hamilton City Council’s investment in the local Novotel 
Hotel; the South Taranaki District Council purchase of  
the Hawera movie theatre, and one of  the Southland local 
authorities’ (Invercargill) ownership of  a local Lotto shop. 
These examples deserve further consideration.
Hamilton City’s investment in the Novotel Hotel 
represents a publicñprivate partnership between the city 
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and Tainui, which was looking to invest some of  its Treaty of  
Waitangi settlement resources in the local economy. While it 
is unusual for a council to invest directly in the operation of  
a hotel, it is not at all unusual for councils to offer incentives 
for business to locate in their districts, through, for example, 
a rates holiday. Hamilton City has every reason to expect the 
central government to support and encourage this investment 
as it fits very well with its national objectives to enhance 
Māori economic development and skills development. We 
should also add that the Novotel itself  has made an important 
contribution to the economic performance of  the city.
South Taranaki’s decision to purchase the building that 
houses the town’s only cinema and subsequently lease it back 
to the cinema operator must surely be seen in the context 
of  a council acting to protect the town’s heritage. Councils 
fund the preservation of  our heritage in numerous ways, 
from giving grants, as Wellington City Council did to the 
Embassy Theatre Trust prior to the launch of  The Lord of  
the Rings, to direct ownership of  opera houses and town halls 
(and sometimes movies are shown in these buildings). Before 
making the decision to purchase the theatre, the council would 
have considered a full range of  options for the building’s 
preservation. It is difficult to think of  the preservation of  our 
past as somehow not being a traditional local government 
role.
The minister’s criticism regarding the Lotto shop is 
puzzling as, seen from a different perspective, it is an example 
of  a council being innovative and fixing a local problem ñ 
something the minister seems to want but is reluctant to 
allow councils to do. The background to the council and the 
Lotto shop story began with the closure of  banks and their 
unwillingness to instal ATM machines in Bluff. Not only were 
local residents in need of  cash, tourists who travelled to land’s 
end often found themselves unable to stay and enjoy the local 
facilities for the same reason. After failing to convince the 
banks to provide an ATM, the council took the logical step of  
purchasing a Kiwibank franchise itself  and placing it in the 
council’s service centre. As it turned out, the Lotto shop was 
part of  the franchise.
As a result of  the council’s initiative, locals and visitors 
now have access to funds and the service centre is generating 
an income to lower its cost to ratepayers. It is a solution in 
which everyone wins, except, apparently, the minister. What 
makes the minister’s discomfort so surprising is that Lotto is 
actually a government-owned service. Hence, the council is 
helping the government by providing a base for one of  its 
Lotto shops in a community that would otherwise not be able 
to access its money and spend it on what they want, including 
gaming and other local services. Why does the minister think 
this is a bad thing? Interestingly, the types of  examples cited 
are not ones of  councils making poor economic choices. 
In many instances the ratepayers benefit through lower 
rates. The criticism seems to be purely about a philosophy 
of  not wanting things done if  they are done by any arm of  
government. Economically, I would venture to suggest that 
few things of  this nature undertaken by councils ‘fail’ as 
councils tend to be very cautious in what they support. 
The minister’s rhetoric on the core service question has 
morphed somewhat since the beginning of  his term. More 
recently it has begun to take an ‘if  you don’t eat your greens 
you won’t get any pudding’ tone. Consider: ‘I also believe, 
its crucial, especially so in these times, that councils ensure 
that core activities are properly identified and funded before 
spending occurs on more discretionary activities’ (Hide, 
2009b). Again, it is a position which begs the question: is there 
a problem and have we got data that suggest core services, or 
big essential stuff, is somehow being overlooked?
Interestingly, the best data are the various analyses 
undertaken of  council long-term plans, undertaken by 
both the Rates Inquiry and more recently the Department 
of  Internal Affairs, which looked at the new 2009ñ2019 
plans. Both analyses show strong evidence of  council 
expenditure dominated by capital investment in the three big 
infrastructures: roads, water and wastewater services. What 
this data tells us is that the Local Government Amendment 
Act (No.3) 1996, which introduced long-term financial 
planning in order to force councils to focus on their long-life 
infrastructures, worked, particularly after these plans became 
subject to audit following the Local Government Act 2002. In 
fact, New Zealand local governments are regarded as amongst 
the best asset managers in the local government world, with 
most Australian states having copied our approaches to asset 
management and long-term planning and our engineers 
selling their expertise internationally.3 
There is, perhaps, one other evidence set we can look at to 
see whether or not councils have their focus on the minister’s 
core services, and that is surveys of  community satisfaction. 
What do citizens think about councils’ performance on the 
development and maintenance of  our big infrastructure 
activities? Councils undertake regular surveys to test citizen 
perception of  the quality of  their services; they are a useful 
window on how councils are perceived. In general, rankings 
tend to be highest for our basic infrastructure services. A 
sample of  residents’ satisfaction surveys taken in 2008 indicates 
relatively positive rankings for the major infrastructural 
services (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Levels of satisfaction with infrastructure services4
Wastewater Potable 
water
Roads Mayor/
councillors
Rotorua 78% 93% 80% 58%
Rodney 78.1% 76.1% 60.8% 58.4%
Waikato 42% 51% 58% 59%
Ashburton 81% 84% 78% 69%
Southland 94.1% 72% 75.9% 90.3%
Porirua 88% 94% 88% N/A
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While noting that in any jurisdiction there may be local issues, 
residents’ views about the performance of  their councils in 
relation to the delivery of  the three large infrastructures does 
not suggest any systemic problem. Considering too their views 
of  the performance of  their elected members, which are all 
relatively positive, with the exception of  Southland which is 
outstanding, the three infrastructures would seem to be the 
least of  our problems.
When Parliament intervenes in the relationship between 
voters and their elected members, or second guesses the 
decisions made by local elected members after deliberating 
with their citizens, it risks weakening not only the framework 
of  local democracy but also New Zealand’s overall democratic 
framework. As Professor John Roberts wrote in 1968:
The growing power of  government, as evidenced by its 
ever increasing intervention in the economic and social 
affairs of  the people, constitutes another reason for the 
existence of  an efficient system of  local 
government. While central and local 
government must share, as collaborative 
partners, the total task of  governing the 
nation, an effective local government 
structure is an important counterweight to 
the growth of  central government power. 
Local government is not solely a matter 
of  the management of  local services; 
it provides the democratic machinery 
for the expression of  local opinion on 
all matters of  public policy. (quoted in 
Boswell, 1981) 
Councils provide a range of  roles within our democratic 
system, including that of  providing a valve for community 
discontent with national policies. If  councils are to play their 
appropriate role in our democracy, citizens and their elected 
members need the authority to make decisions about their 
various localities. Parliament currently places obligations on 
local authorities with regard to some of  the activities they 
undertake and the decision-making processes they operate. 
This is fair and reasonable. However, if  democracy is to 
operate effectively, Parliament must be circumspect in how 
it exercises its authority and ensure that it focuses only on 
matters of  national interest, supporting local democracy and 
allowing it to address those issues that are of  local or regional 
nature.
Conclusion
As framed by the minister of  local government, the issue of  
core services not only concerns the role of  councils, it has a 
direct bearing on the capacity of  councillors to make decisions. 
The minister has suggested that decisions to go beyond ‘the 
core’ might be left up to citizens themselves to decide, through 
a poll or referendum. The immediate concerns of  the local 
government sector involve cost and complexity (imagine the 
cost of  referenda in a city as big as the new Auckland) and 
the loss of  flexibility to act as local issues and needs require. 
However, referenda also provide additional opportunities 
for minority interests to influence or capture the allocation 
of  public resources. International experience, for example in 
California, is replete with examples of  wealthy single-interest 
groups exploiting referenda opportunities to promote their 
particular agendas. They also create the ‘tyranny of  the 
majority’ problem. How likely is it that initiatives such as a 
marae development plan or a recreation project for disabled 
children would survive if  dependent on community referenda? 
It is often only through strong and inclusive leadership by 
elected members that marginalised groups are acknowledged 
and treated equitably. These are judgements best made by 
elected members who can weigh up the benefits and costs and 
the overall contribution not only to the current generation 
but to future generations, and be accountable for them. 
Local Government New Zealand’s research on rate capping 
(NZIER, 2009) shows that long-term planning models, in 
which elected members are responsible for making decisions 
in consultation with their citizens, are the most sustainable 
decision-making approaches.
How would, for example, the private sector work if  
Parliament determined what products it could produce 
and then required all shareholders to vote before major 
expenditure investments could be made? I suspect the answer 
is poorly, as historic international examples could illustrate. We 
need cities and towns that are vibrant and innovative because 
without these qualities they will fail to attract the investment 
and the new citizens the country needs in order to prosper. 
We cannot afford a standardised approach to governing our 
communities and rigid central dictates cannot fit or know best 
in all circumstances.
While the minister’s challenge addresses the question 
of  whether or not councils should have a core of  services 
defined by Parliament (other than those which are currently 
mandatory), it raises a more fundamental question. That 
question concerns the relative roles of  central and local 
politicians. The minister’s focus on core services is actually 
an attack on local representative democracy and the role 
and competence of  local politicians. His charges that local 
politicians are responsible for silly and outlandish expenditure 
decisions are not justified and his solutions to this non-problem 
will erode their decision-making authority by a combination 
of  greater centralisation and direct participation. Changes of  
We need cities and towns that are vibrant  
and innovative because without these  
qualities they will fail to attract the investment 
and the new citizens the country needs in 
order to prosper. 
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Roads:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Local 
Government Act and Land Transport Management Act 
to provide services for this activity.
Rubbish and recycling:
• Council has legal responsibilities, in relation to the activity, 
under the Health Act 1956 and the Local Government 
Act 1974 to improve, promote and protect public 
health through providing effective and efficient waste 
management. 
Wastewater:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Health 
Act 1956 to improve, promote and protect public health 
within the district. This includes identifying the need for 
waste and stormwater services and either providing these 
directly, or overseeing the service if  it is provided by others. 
The Local Government Act 2002 requires the ongoing 
waste and stormwater services by council, unless specific 
approval is sought to withdraw from this.
Water:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Health Act 
1956 to improve, promote and protect public health within 
the district. The Local Government Act 2002 requires the 
ongoing operation of  water supplies by council.
Community planning and consultation:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Local 
Government Act 2002 to produce a large number of  
plans, strategies, policies and statements. 
District planning:
• Council has statutory obligations under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA) to provide the services 
for this activity. The RMA requires the sustainable 
management of  natural and physical resources.
Animal control:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Dog 
Control Act 1996 and the Impounding Act 1955 to 
provide services for this activity.
Building control:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Building 
Act 2004 to provide the services for this activity. The 
Building Act provides for the regulation of  building work, 
a licensing regime for building practitioners and the setting 
of  performance standards for buildings.
Emergency services:
• Council has statutory responsibilities under the Civil 
Defence Act 2002, the Fire Services Act 1975 and various 
other acts and regulations to provide the services for this 
activity. Rural fire and civil defence are core activities 
required through various acts and regulations to ensure we 
can respond quickly and effectively to local emergencies.
Regulatory and environmental health:
• Council has statutory obligations under numerous statutes 
including the Health Act 1956, Resource Management 
Act 1991, Food Act 1981, the Sale of  Liquor Act 1989, 
the Gambling Act 2003 and the Prostitution Act 2003 to 
provide services for this activity.
Gardens and green spaces:
• Council has statutory responsibilities to administer reserves 
under the Local Government Act 2002 and the Reserves 
Act 1977. Councils also have statutory responsibilities 
Appendix: Mandatory functions: territorial local authorities
this magnitude, which have implications for the constitutional 
balance between local and central government and the way in 
which citizens traditionally perceive local government, require 
the involvement of  the full community, as their implications 
for local government, and by extension local communities, 
are probably more important than the introduction of  MMP 
was for Parliament.
The core service debate is a solution looking for a problem. 
Existing checks and balances appear to be working well and 
focusing elected members’ attention on the big essential 
infrastructure items, to the effect that today councils are 
arguably more focused on the big items than they were in 
the past. That was what Parliament intended in 1996 with 
the Local Government Amendment (No.3) Act, and all the 
evidence suggests it was successful. The minister’s attempts 
to identify and emphasise a set of  core services seem not only 
unnecessary but, overall, counter-productive.
1 In a later interview the minister informed the interviewer that libraries would be a core 
service as well, otherwise his mother would stop talking to him. Rumour has it that librarians 
from Waitakere City sent Mrs Hide flowers.
2 Coincidentally with the release of the TAFM paper the prime minister and government 
contributed to the purchase of Auckland harbour land to enable the council to develop ‘party 
central’ for visitors to that city – hardly a fit with the minister’s more narrow list of core 
services.
3 For example, the former chief executive of Rodney District is advising the United States 
military on how to develop effective asset management plans utilising the methodologies 
based on those developed at his former council. 
4 The Rotorua survey was undertaken by National Research Bureau (NRB) and is available 
from www.rdc.govt.nz; the Rodney survey was carried out by International Research 
Consultants Ltd and is available from www.rodney.govt.nz; the Waikato survey was 
undertaken by NRB and is available from www.waidc.govt.nz; the Ashburton survey was 
carried out by NRB and is available from www.adc.govt.nz; the Southland survey was 
undertaken by Polson Higgs and is available from www.southlanddc.govt.nz; the Porirua 
survey was carried out by NRB and is available from www.pcc.govt.nz.
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to provide certain types of  public spaces. Council must 
provide cemeteries for the district under the Burials and 
Cremation Act 1964 (and amendments).
Community buildings:
• Community housing and community buildings are 
discretionary activities; however, the Local Government 
Act 2002 defines community housing as a strategic asset.
Representation:
• Council has statutory obligations under the Local Electoral 
Act 2001, the Local Government Act 2002 and other 
statutes to provide the services for this activity (council and 
community boards). 
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